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Abstract This paper examines the relationship between the business cycle and
individuals’ duration in unemployment. I use multi-spell unemployment duration data
of British males and monthly series of regional vacancies over unemployment, referred
to as labour market tightness, to control for the business cycle. In line with most pre-
vious studies I find that the observed negative duration dependence on an aggregate
level is explained by both sorting and strong negative individual duration dependence,
and that the individual hazard of leaving unemployment increases with labour market
tightness. The new empirical findings emerge from the interactions between individual
duration dependence and the business cycle. Individual heterogeneity, and in particu-
lar the variation over the business cycle in the composition of the newly unemployed,
explains most of the systematic variation over the business cycle in duration depen-
dence on an aggregate level. Individual duration dependence does not vary over the
business cycle in a way that would lend support to the predictions concerning this of
the matching model of Lockwood (Rev Econ Stud 58:733–753, 1991) or the ranking
model of Blanchard and Diamond (Rev Econ Stud 61:417–434, 1994).
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The relationship between individuals’ duration in unemployment and the business
cycle is of prime importance in the determination of aggregate unemployment dynam-
ics (Layard et al. 1991). To gain insights in this relationship this paper presents detailed
and new empirical evidence for Britain on how an individual’s hazard of leaving
unemployment is affected by the duration in unemployment (i.e. individual duration
dependence), individual heterogeneity and the business cycle. In particular, this paper
significantly contributes to the empirical literature by analysing in detail how individ-
ual duration dependence varies over the business cycle. Identifying this variation yields
important insights for policymakers in the extent to which the long-term unemployed
benefit from a tight labour market, i.e. when there are many vacancies relative to the
number of unemployed. For instance, if the long-term unemployed benefit less than
the short-term unemployed from a tight labour market then policy aimed at getting the
long-term unemployed back into employment should be intensified when the labour
market is tightening.
The empirical analysis makes use of a large administrative dataset containing
multi-spell unemployment duration data of British males from April 1987 to
September 1996. Monthly series of regional vacancies over unemployment are used to
control for the business cycle and this variable is referred to as labour market tightness.
The multi-spell nature of the data yields the main contribution to the literature as this
makes it possible to identify the interactions between individual duration dependence
and labour market tightness when modelling the hazard of leaving unemployment.
Previous UK studies addressing this issue employ either single-spell duration data or
aggregate data.
Lockwood (1991) and Blanchard and Diamond (1994) present theoretical economic
models explaining the relationship between individuals’ duration in unemployment
and labour market tightness. The ranking model of Blanchard and Diamond (1994)
assumes that an employer ranks applicants by their unemployment durations and hires
the one with the shortest duration. This ranking model predicts an increase in an
individual’s hazard of leaving unemployment with labour market tightness, negative
individual duration dependence and, moreover, that the predicted negative individual
duration dependence is weaker the tighter the labour market. The latter result comes
from the fact that the tighter the labour market, the lower the ratio of applications to
vacancies, the more likely the long-term unemployed is the sole applicant, and, as a
consequence of the ranking strategy, the more likely the long-term unemployed is hired.
The matching model of Lockwood (1991) considers firms imperfectly testing workers
before hiring them. In his model unemployment duration is a signal of productivity
and, consequently, predicts that in equilibrium, if it is profitable for a firm to test, it is
also profitable for firms to base their hiring decision on unemployment duration. The
matching model of Lockwood (1991) predicts an increase in an individual’s hazard
of leaving unemployment with labour market tightness, negative individual duration
dependence and, due to this discriminative behaviour of firms, that negative individual
duration dependence is stronger the tighter the labour market. This latter result comes
from the fact that a long spell of unemployment is more of a bad signal to a firm when
there are many vacancies relative to the number unemployed (in a tight labour market).
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To summarize, the matching model of Lockwood (1991) and the ranking model of
Blanchard and Diamond (1994) both predict an increase in an individual’s hazard of
leaving unemployment with labour market tightness and negative individual duration
dependence but yield opposite predictions concerning the variation over the business
cycle in individual duration dependence. The empirical analysis in this paper examines
these predictions. This makes it possible to discriminate between the two theoretical
economic models of Lockwood (1991) and Blanchard and Diamond (1994) that are
both aimed at explaining unemployment durations over the business cycle.
The empirical literature on unemployment duration unambiguously shows that the
aggregate hazard of leaving unemployment for British males decreases with unem-
ployment duration (Layard et al. 1991; Van den Berg and Van Ours 1994; Turon
2003).1 This so-called negative duration dependence can be explained by both sorting
and negative individual duration dependence. Sorting refers to a dynamic selection
mechanism based on a relationship between individual heterogeneity and the hazard
of leaving unemployment. For instance, heterogeneity can relate to job performance
and those perceived to be most productive are hired first (Salant 1977) or to the
effectiveness of jobseekers (Jackman and Layard 1991). Negative individual duration
dependence may be caused by, for instance, a loss of skills (Pissarides 1992) or stigma
effects (Vishwanath 1989; Jackman and Layard 1991) and identifying individual dura-
tion dependence is therefore of special interest to policymakers. If there is negative
individual duration dependence policy should be aimed at preventing individuals from
becoming long-term unemployed and should start as early as possible (e.g. assisted job
search). If sorting plays a role policy should be aimed at increasing the employability
of the unemployed (e.g. educational programs). Using aggregate British data, Van den
Berg and Van Ours (1994) and Turon (2003) conclude that for British males individual
heterogeneity plays no significant role in explaining negative duration dependence,
i.e. there are no sorting effects. Using individual level British data, Nickell (1979),
Lancaster (1979) and Narendranathan and Stewart (1993a) show the importance of
observed heterogeneity, such as age and educational attainment, and unobserved (time-
constant) heterogeneity for explaining the probability of leaving unemployment. In
line with these latter findings, the analysis in this paper identifies significant sorting
effects due to individual heterogeneity and furthermore shows that this accounts for
about one-third of the observed decrease in the hazard of leaving unemployment with
duration within the first 2 years of unemployment on an aggregate level. Negative indi-
vidual duration dependence explains the remaining two-thirds of this decrease. Strong
negative individual duration dependence is a common finding in British studies and
is in line with both the matching model of Lockwood (1991) and the ranking model
of Blanchard and Diamond (1994).
The variation over the business cycle in the composition of the newly unem-
ployed with respect to their employability is referred to as inflow heterogeneity. Darby
et al. (1985) argue that in a situation of a loose labour market, i.e. few vacancies rel-
ative to the number of unemployed, the newly unemployment have relatively lower
probabilities of leaving unemployment (lower employability). This is referred to as
1 Similar observations are recorded for other countries; see, e.g., Abbring et al. (2001, 2002) for the US
and France and Cockx and Dejemeppe (2005) for Belgium.
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pro-cyclical inflow heterogeneity. Darby et al. (1985) claim that the main reason for
longer unemployment durations during an economic recession is pro-cyclical inflow
heterogeneity. Turon (2003), using aggregate data, concludes that in Britain inflow
heterogeneity is counter-cyclical. The analysis in this paper also identifies counter-
cyclical inflow heterogeneity and this is not in support the claim of Darby et al. (1985).2
The empirical evidence for Britain concerning the variation over the business cycle
in the hazard of leaving unemployment points to an increase in the probability of leav-
ing unemployment with labour market tightness, i.e. pro-cyclical sensitivity (Jackman
and Layard 1991; Narendranathan and Stewart 1993b; Arulampalum and Stewart
1995; Turon 2003; Kalwij 2004).3 The analysis in this paper confirms that the indi-
vidual hazard of leaving unemployment increases with labour market tightness. This
finding is in line with both the matching model of Lockwood (1991) and the ranking
model of Blanchard and Diamond (1994).
The empirical evidence on the variation over the business cycle in individual
duration dependence is scarce, inconclusive and is mostly examined using US data
(Dynarski and Sheffrin 1990; Imbens and Lynch 1993).4 For Britain, and both using
aggregate data, Jackman and Layard (1991) conclude there are no systematic effects
and Turon (2003) finds that negative duration dependence is weaker the tighter the
labour market but that this effect is insignificant. In contrast to these findings the anal-
ysis in this paper shows that negative duration dependence on an aggregate level is
somewhat stronger the tighter the labour market at short durations and is weaker the
tighter the labour market at long durations. This in line with the US evidence reported
in Abbring et al. (2001). However, the analysis in this paper furthermore shows that
most of this systematic variation on an aggregate level is explained by individual het-
erogeneity and in particular by the variation over the business cycle in the unobserved
composition of the newly unemployed (inflow heterogeneity). After controlling for
individual heterogeneity, individual duration dependence does not vary over the busi-
ness cycle in a way that would lend support to the predictions concerning this of the
matching model of Lockwood (1991) or the ranking model of Blanchard and Diamond
(1994). Moreover I show that when controlling for individual heterogeneity but not
for inflow heterogeneity, as is often the case in empirical research, one can mistakenly
conclude that there is empirical evidence in favour of negative individual duration
dependence being weaker the tighter the labour market, as predicted by the ranking
model of Blanchard and Diamond (1994) and reported in, for instance, Dynarski and
Sheffrin (1990) for the US.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 formu-
lates the econometric model. Section 4 reports and discusses the estimation results
and Sect. 5 summarizes.
2 For the US Baker (1992) and Abbring et al. (2001) also find no support for this claim.
3 A similar finding is reported for the US (Sider 1985; Butler and McDonald 1986; Dynarski and Sheffrin
1990; Baker 1992; Abbring et al. 2001), for France (Van den Berg and Van der Klaauw 2001) and Denmark
(Rosholm 2001).
4 Rosholm (2001) presents evidence for Denmark and Abbring et al. (2002) for France.
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2 The data
This section describes the data I use for the empirical analysis. Section 2.1 discusses
the sampling procedure, defines unemployment and the observed variables in the data.
Section 2.2 discusses the sample selection procedure and Sect. 2.3 presents descriptive
statistics.
2.1 The Joint Unemployment and Vacancy Operating System (JUVOS)
The empirical analysis makes use of rather unique data, taken from the Joint
Unemployment and Vacancy Operating System (JUVOS). The JUVOS is a longitudi-
nal database of a five percent sample of all claims for unemployment related benefits
paid through the National Unemployment Benefits System in Britain since 1982 and
is updated daily using information supplied by the Employment Service local offices.
Unemployment related benefit claims in Northern Ireland are included only from 1994
onwards. Sampling is based on a claimant’s National Insurance number and yields a
random and representative (stock) sample of the unemployed population in Britain at
any day of the year. The data available for this paper are only one-fifth of the JUVOS
data up to 1999, which amounts to a one percent random sample of all unemploy-
ment related benefits claims. A claim of an individual is included in the sample if
the individual has a National Insurance number that ends in a specific pair of digits
and is in unemployment during the observation period. An individual is continuously
followed over the years (1982–1999) and included in the JUVOS whenever claiming
unemployment related benefits. Of this sample I select the unemployment spells that
started during the observation period. This yields a representative (flow) sample of the
unemployed population in Britain who entered unemployment at any time during the
observation period. The sampling scheme is based on the National Insurance number
and this makes it possible to follow the same individual over the years, hence creating
multiple spell observations for individuals entering unemployment more than once.
For more background information on the JUVOS I refer to Ward and Bird (1995) and
Sweeney (1996), and to Kalwij (2004) for a description of lifecycle unemployment
experiences for a selective group of young British males. Van den Berg and Van Ours
(1994) and Turon (2003) also make use of JUVOS data but on an aggregate level.
Using the JUVOS data defines unemployment as claiming unemployment related
benefits. Individuals who become unemployed are entitled to benefits up to 12 months
if they have paid enough National Insurance contributions. These insurance-based
benefits are not means tested. Individuals who are not entitled to these benefits or
individuals who exhaust these benefits are eligible for means tested benefits nowa-
days known as Income Based Job Seekers Allowance (JSA). This allowance is part of
the UK welfare system and, as long as the means tested criteria is met, has an indefinite
duration. JUVOS registers when an individual receives JSA.
JUVOS records consist of the start and end date of a claim. The JUVOS has
complete information on individuals’ gender, date of birth and marital status, and
the region in which the claim is made. The ten regions considered are South East
(including Greater London), South West, East Anglia, East Midlands, West Midlands,
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North West, Yorkshire and Humberside, North, Scotland and Wales. Information
on marital status allows for the distinction between single (including widowed and
divorced) and married (including cohabitating). As is often the case with adminis-
trative data, only limited information is available on individuals’ characteristics. For
instance, the level of education and work experience are not observed and extending
the empirical work by using information on the human capital accumulation of an indi-
vidual with age is considered a very important avenue for future research. Although the
absence of information on individuals’ human capital may limit the issues one wishes
to examine, a very important advantage of the JUVOS data is that many individuals
are observed over a long time period, creating multi-spell observations. This makes
it possible to thoroughly examine the variation over the business cycle in individual
duration dependence of the hazard of leaving unemployment.
2.2 Sample selection
Since 1982 several labour market programs have been initiated to get the unemployed
back into work. Examples are the Youth Training Scheme that was introduced in 1983
(Dolton et al. 1994) and the in 1987 introduced Restart programme to monitor more
closely the long-term unemployed (Dolton and O’Neill 1996). Also the period of enti-
tlement for unemployment benefits has been reduced from a maximum of 12 months
to a maximum of 6 months for individuals who enter unemployment from October
1996 onwards. In April 1998 the New Deal program has been implemented (Bell et al.
1999). These policy interventions were intended to affect individuals’ unemployment
durations. It is not an aim of this paper to predict how these may have affected, for
instance, the pattern of individual duration dependence over the business cycle. The
data in this paper do not identify participation in job search or training programs
and can therefore not control for program participation. I therefore select the best
I can a homogenous sample with respect to the policy-environment, hereby taking
into account that a sufficiently long period is needed to identify cyclical effects in
the unemployment durations. I therefore select the sample period that starts when the
Restart programme was effective and ends when the maximum duration of benefit
entitlement was reduced from 12 to 6 months. Thus I select unemployment spells that
started in or after April 1987 and in or before September 1996. I censor all unem-
ployment spells that continue after September 1996. The conclusions of this paper,
however, appear rather insensitive to selecting different time periods.5 The resulting
sample is a representative flow sample of unemployment spells over the period April
1987 to September 1996. This period covers an entire business cycle.
A further selection is that I restrict the sample to men aged 18 to 59 years. The
1988 Social Security Act changed the benefit entitlements of individuals younger
than 18 and to receive benefits they no longer need to sign on as unemployed. Many
unemployed women with a partner who is an earner are unlikely to be entitled to
Income Based Job Seekers Allowance after exhausting benefits and therefore leave
5 For instance, for a comparison using the period 1982IV–1998II refer to a previous version (Kalwij 2001).
In this previous version I use a somewhat different empirical specification but the main conclusions are the
same as in this paper.
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Table 1 Frequency distribution of the number of multiple unemployment spells
Number of spells 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 >9
% of men 40.0 22.0 13.5 8.8 5.6 3.6 2.3 1.6 0.9 1.7
the JUVOS without actually having found employment. Van den Berg and Van Ours
(1994) also conclude that JUVOS data of British females are ‘unreliable’ for the anal-
ysis of unemployment durations. For unemployed men this issue does not seriously
affect the unemployment count (Nickell 1999).
2.3 Descriptive statistics6
The sample used for the empirical analysis contains information on men aged 18–59
years who became at least one time unemployed between April 1987 and September
1996. In total 83,388 men make up for 222,901 spells of unemployment. 5.8% of the
spells are right-censored. Table 1 shows that 60% of the men in the sample experience
more than one spell of unemployment during the observation period.
Figure 1 shows the (aggregate) hazard of leaving unemployment and the survival
function for up to 30 months in unemployment. For this descriptive purpose I estimate
the model of Sect. 3 and control only for the duration in unemployment. Figure 1
confirms the commonly observed strong decrease in the aggregate hazard of leaving
unemployment with elapsed duration in Britain during the first year in unemploy-
ment. This decline is not smooth since it is likely to be affected by the labour market
programme Restart that is targeted at getting the unemployed back into work. The
Restart programme consists of a compulsory interview after being unemployed for
6 months. The interview is designed to help the unemployed back into a job and make
him less dependent on unemployment benefits. The employment office evaluates in
detail the situation of the unemployed and provides job search advice and brings job-
seekers in contact with employers or training agencies. This is likely to be the cause of
the observed increase in the hazard of leaving unemployment after 6 months (Fig. 1).
After the first interview the unemployed is in principle interviewed every 6 months.
After (at most) 1 year a jobseeker moves to JSA (means tested) and also attends again
a Restart interview. The treatment is rather heterogeneous, depending on the needs of
the unemployed and the willingness of the unemployed to cooperate at an early stage.
For instance, after 1 year many unemployed are more closely monitored and (have to)
attend a so-called 1-2-1 programme that lasts for 6–12 weeks and is aimed at increasing
the opportunities to find work. This may explain the increase in the hazard of leaving
unemployment after the 12th month up to the 16th month (Fig. 1). Intensive counsel-
ling takes place again after 24 months and appropriate actions are then taken. This may
explain the strong increase in the hazard of leaving unemployment. Of course, as in
most studies, I cannot identify the causal effects of a labour market programme such
as Restart on the hazard of leaving unemployment due to data limitations, but merely
6 For additional descriptive statistics of the JUVOS sample I refer to Kalwij (2001, 2004).
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Fig. 1 The hazard rate of leaving unemployment within 1 month, as a function of the duration in
unemployment, up to 30 months and the corresponding survival probability
point to plausible explanations of why the hazard rate is not smoothly declining with
the duration in unemployment. The estimated survival function shows that 79.4% of
unemployed men leave unemployment within 1 year and 5.7% are still unemployed
after 30 months. Table 2 reports on the distribution of observations across the regions,
marital status and age categories. The median unemployment duration is 4 months.
The majority of observations are located in the South East, which is also the largest
region by population size. Most unemployed are observed to be young and single.
I use the ratio of the stock of job vacancies over unemployment as indicator for the
business cycle and refer to this as labour market tightness. The higher (lower) is this
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics of
the covariates
Data: 84,388 men aged
18–59 years over the period
April 1987 to September 1996,
in total 222,901 spells of
unemployment and 5.8% of the
spells are incomplete




South East (including London) 28.0 4
East Anglia 3.1 3
South West 8.2 3
West Midlands 8.8 4
East Midlands 6.6 4
Yorkshire and Humberside 9.8 3






Not single 42.3 4
Single 57.7 4
All 100.0 4











ratio the tighter (looser) is the labour market. The advantages of using this indicator are
that I follow the theoretical work discussed in the introduction and on matching models
(Pissarides 2000) and, from practical viewpoint, that this indicator can be constructed
monthly on a regional level. Jackman and Layard (1991) and Turon (2003) also use
this indicator. Vacancies are defined as vacancies at regional job centres and unem-
ployment is defined as the regional claimant count. Figure 2 reports on this indicator
per region and month over the observation period. Important is that the time span of the
sample covers an entire business cycle. There may be underreporting of the number
of vacancies as not all of them are registered at the regional job centres. The empirical
analysis (partly) deals with this issue by only exploiting time variation for identifica-
tion of the effects of the business cycle on unemployment duration. Regional specific
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Fig. 2 Monthly regional vacancies over unemployment (labour market tightness) Source: National
Statistics, http://www.statistics.gov.uk
of the regional job centres in gathering the information (see Sect. 3). Figure 2 shows
considerable regional diversity in the variation over time in the indicator of labour
market tightness.
3 Econometric model and empirical specification
Section 3.1 outlines the econometric model. Section 3.2 discusses the identification
of the model and Sect. 3.3 presents the empirical specification.
3.1 The econometric model
A multi-spell mixed proportional hazard rate model is used to model individuals’
unemployment durations. The approach I take is considered to be a reduced-form
approach and is taken in most of the empirical studies discussed in the introduction
that analyse unemployment durations. Kalwij (2004) uses a similar econometric model
for analyzing repeated unemployment of young British males. Lancaster (1990) and
Van den Berg (2001) provide excellent overviews of the literature on the usage of
these models and the linkage with the economic framework of job search theory.
The number of unemployment spells experienced by individual i is denoted by
Ki , the starting date of the kth unemployment spell is denoted by τik , the duration of
the kth unemployment spell by tik and cik is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the kth
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unemployment spell is incomplete (right-censored) and equal to 0 otherwise. N denotes
the number of individuals in the sample. Xik is a vector of observed individual char-
acteristics and the unobserved individual specific characteristic is denoted by νi . The
(conditional) hazard rate of leaving unemployment is denoted by h(tik |τik, Xik, νi ;β),
where β is a population parameter vector. The density function of the duration of
unemployment is













The survival function is given by












The likelihood contribution for an incomplete spell is the survival function. For each
individual the set of observations is denoted by Hi = {τik, tik, cik, Xik}k=1,...,Ki . A
support point approach as described in Heckman and Singer (1984) is used to model
the distribution of the unobserved individual specific characteristic νi . The number of
mass points is denoted by P , a mass point is denoted by νp, and the corresponding
probability mass is given by Pr
(
νi = νp
) = πp. I refer to Huh and Sickles (1994) for
a discussion on the empirical implementation of this method and a comparison with
alternative parametric approaches. Using the mass point distribution and Eqs. 1 and 2,








[ f (tik |τik, Xik, νp;β)





where θ = (β, ν1, . . . , νP , π1, . . . , πP ). The maximum likelihood estimates are given
by




ln (Li (Hi |θ)). (4)
3.2 Model identification
The identification of a single spell duration model with duration dependence and
a distribution of unobserved heterogeneity is achieved by making a proportionality
assumption and an assumption concerning either the first moment or the tail behaviour
of the mixing distribution (Elbers and Ridder 1982). In practice, however, identification
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based on these assumptions may turn out to be problematic (Baker and Melino 2000).
The data I use for estimating the model presented above contain multiple unemploy-
ment spells for many individuals (multi-spell data). This panel aspect of the data is
very important for the identification of the model outlined above. In particular it is
important for the identification of the interactions between labour market tightness (the
business cycle indicator) and individual duration dependence. Honoré (1993) shows
that identification of a multi-spell mixed proportional hazard model is achieved under
much weaker assumptions than a single-spell mixed proportional hazard model and,
most importantly, he shows that with a fixed heterogeneity distribution over spells it
is not necessary to make any assumptions about the mixing distribution. Van den Berg
(2001) provides an excellent overview of identification issues when using multi-spell
duration data. Important for this paper is that when using multi-spell data the identi-
fication of the model outlined above requires that the unobserved individual specific
characteristic (νi ) is constant across spells and requires proportionality between the
unobserved individual heterogeneity term (νi ) and the duration effect. Identification
of the model does not require that there are observed explanatory variables and as
a result the distribution of νi is conditional on Xik . A further important advantage
is that the model does not require proportionality between the observed explanatory
variables and individual duration dependence. This means that interactions between
labour market tightness and the duration in unemployment are allowed for.
The theoretical results discussed above on the identification of a multi-spell mixed
proportional hazard model require at least two completed spells of unemployment
for each individual (Van den Berg 2001). However, for 40% of the individuals in the
data I observe only one complete or incomplete spell of unemployment (see Table 1).
To provide insights in the empirical importance of this for model identification, the
empirical analysis has been repeated for a selective sample of individuals with at least
two completed spells of unemployment (see Table 5). The empirical results changed
only marginally and did not alter the main conclusions of this paper. For this reason,
and to avoid any selectivity biases, I use the whole sample, including individuals with
only one spell of unemployment, when estimating the model outlined in this section.
3.3 The empirical specification
The empirical hazard rate function of leaving unemployment is formalized as follows
ln(h(s|τik, Xik, νi ;β)) = ψ1(s|β1) + ψ2(s|τik;β2)
+ ψ3(s|Xik;β3) + ψ4(τik, νi ;β4). (5)
The (elapsed) duration in unemployment is denoted by s. The first term in the r.h.s.
(right hand side) is the effect of the duration in unemployment on the hazard of leaving
unemployment, i.e. individual duration dependence, the second term is the effect of
the state of the business cycle at calendar time (τik + s) on the hazard and on indi-
vidual duration dependence, the third term is the effect of observed (time varying)
individual heterogeneity on the hazard and the fourth term controls for unobserved
individual heterogeneity (νi ). Inflow heterogeneity, i.e. the variation over the business
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cycle in the (unobserved) composition of the newly unemployed, is modelled as a
shift in the mean of the distribution of unobserved individual heterogeneity. Below I
discuss the specification of these four terms in more detail.
The empirical specifications of the first four terms in the r.h.s. of Eq. 5 are as follows.
Individual duration dependence is parameterised using monthly dummy variables
ψ1(s|β1) = β1,1 +
30∑
d=2
β1,d I (s = d) + β1,31 I (s ≥ 31) + β1,32 I (s ≥ 31)ln(s). (6)
I (.) is an indicator function equal to one if the argument is true and equal to zero
otherwise. The parameters β1,2, . . . , β1,32 determine the pattern of individual duration
dependence in the baseline situation. I use a flexible specification up to and includ-
ing the 30th month. From the 31st month onwards individual duration dependence is
modelled using the logarithm of duration. About 3% of the completed spells in the
sample have a duration exceeding 30 months.7
The business cycle is allowed to affect the hazard of leaving unemployment, indi-
vidual duration dependence, and the composition of the newly unemployed (second
and fourth terms in the r.h.s. of Eq. 5). I refer to Imbens (1994) for a discussion on the
identification of duration and calendar time effects. The effects of the business cycle
on the hazard of leaving unemployment are identified without making an additional
assumption, given the available data, but to also identify inflow heterogeneity, together
with a flexible individual duration dependence specification, demands an identifying
assumption. This is because duration is always equal to the time of entering minus the
time of leaving unemployment. Following the studies discussed in the introduction
that use individual-level data, these time effects are identified by using a business
cycle indicator.8 As is discussed in Sect. 2, I use the logarithm of monthly regional
labour market tightness, defined as the number of vacancies over unemployment, as
an indicator for the business cycle [denoted by ln(VU)]
ψ2(s|τik;β2) = β2,1ln(V Uτik+s ) +
30∑
d=2
β2,d I (s = d)ln(V Uτik+s )




β2,31+m I (Mτik+s = m). (7)
β2,1 is the effect of the business cycle on the hazard of leaving unemployment, and the
parameters β2,2, . . . , β2,32 determine the variation in individual duration dependence
over the business cycle. Testing whether or not individual duration dependence varies
over the business cycle amounts to testing the hypothesis H0 : β2,2 = · · · = β2,32 = 0.
7 Censoring the data at 30 months does not change the main conclusions of this paper.
8 In an earlier version I included year dummy variables in the hazard of leaving unemployment. This did
not affect the main results of the paper. To keep the results transparent I omit these and only control for
time effects through labour market tightness (the business cycle indicator).
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The last term in the r.h.s. of Eq. 7 includes the seasonal effects in the hazard of leaving
unemployment and the parameters β2,33, . . . , β2,43 denote the effects for, respectively,
February to December, with January as reference month and where M denotes the
month of leaving unemployment. The observed covariates are modelled as follows















The covariate single is a dummy variable equal to one if the individual is single at the
beginning of the unemployment spell, and zero otherwise. The covariate region is the
region in which the Employment Office is located where the individual is registered.
Ten regions are distinguished and the reference region is ‘South East’ (see Sect. 2). The
time-varying covariate agegr(s) is the age group of the individual at elapsed duration
s.9 I distinguish nine age groups: 18–20, 21–25, 26–30, 31–35, 36–40, 41–45, 46–50,
51–55 and 56–59 years. The reference age group is 18–20 years.
As discussed above, identification of the model requires unobserved individual het-
erogeneity (νi ) to enter the log-hazard rate additively. Therefore, in line with Turon
(2003), inflow heterogeneity is modelled by allowing the mean of the distribution of
the unobserved individual specific characteristic (νi ) to shift with (the logarithm of)
labour market tightness and the month at the time of entering unemployment. This
is formalized by allowing the hazard of leaving unemployment to depend on labour
market tightness and the calendar month at the time of entering unemployment (τik),
with January as the reference month,
ψ4(τik, νi ;β4) = β4.1 ln(V Uτik ) +
12∑
m=2
β4,m I (Mτik = m) + νi . (9)
4 Empirical results
Section 4.1 presents the estimation results. Section 4.2 discusses in more detail indi-
vidual duration dependence over the business cycle and Sect. 4.3 presents a sensitivity
analysis and compares the results with the findings of previous studies.
The estimation results of the complete model as outlined in Sect. 3 are reported in
the Appendix. To facilitate the discussion I summarize the empirical results in Figs. 3,
4, 5 and Table 3 for a reference individual and evaluate business cycle effects at three
states: a relatively tight and loose labour market and the baseline situation where
labour market tightness is at its regional average. A loose labour market refers to
the 10th percentile, the baseline situation to the 50th percentile and a tight labour
9 Including the age category at the start of the spell as a time-constant covariate [instead of agegrik(s)]
does not affect the main results and conclusions.
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Fig. 3 Estimated hazard of leaving unemployment as a function of the duration in unemployment and the
corresponding survivor function for a reference individual
market to the 90th percentile of the empirical distribution of labour market tightness.
I choose as baseline case, or reference individual, an 18 to 20 years old single man,
who became unemployed in January, is in his first month of unemployment, registered
at an employment office in the South East and his unobserved characteristic is of type
2 (ν2). The reference individual in the baseline situation has a hazard rate of leaving
unemployment equal to 0.18 and this baseline value is set equal to 100% in Table 3.
Thus the percentages reported in Table 3 are percentages of the baseline hazard and
because a proportional hazard specification is used the effect on the baseline hazard of
any combination of characteristics is a combination of the corresponding percentages.
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Fig. 4 Duration dependence with and without controlling for individual heterogeneity. The hazard rate of
leaving unemployment in the first month is normalised to 1
4.1 Estimation results
Figure 3a shows that the hazard of leaving unemployment increases sharply from
the first to the second month in unemployment and decreases thereafter with elapsed
duration. The hazard of leaving unemployment in the 12th month is 88% of that of the
hazard in the first month and 55% of the hazard in the second month. Figure 3b shows
that a reference individual has about a 90% probability of leaving unemployment
within 1 year.
Table 3, first part, reports on the business cycle effects on individuals’ hazard of
leaving unemployment. Table 3 (top, first column) shows that an individual’s hazard of
leaving unemployment increases strongly with labour market tightness. The baseline
hazard of leaving unemployment is almost 80% higher in a tight than in a loose labour
market (134.1 vs. 74.6). The most notable seasonal variation in the hazard of leaving
unemployment is the relatively low hazards in November and December. Table 3 (top,
last columns) reports on the effect of labour market tightness on (unobserved) inflow
heterogeneity with respect to the hazard of leaving unemployment and shows that men
who become unemployed when the labour market is tight have on average a 21% lower
hazard of leaving unemployment than men who become unemployed when the labour
market is loose. Seasonal differences in the composition of the newly unemployed
with respect to the hazard of leaving unemployment are relatively small.
Table 3, second half, reports on the effects of individual heterogeneity on the hazard
of leaving unemployment. The age effects show a rapid decrease in the hazard with
age for the young unemployed and a relatively constant hazard from the mid 30’s
onwards. Regional differences in the hazard of leaving unemployment are relatively
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Fig. 5 Individual duration dependence over the business cycle
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Table 3 The empirical results
Time of leaving unemployment Estimate SE Time of entering unemployment Estimate SE
Business cyclea Business cyclea
Tight labour market 134.1 1.38 Tight labour market 88.7 0.64
Baseline* 100.0 – Baseline* 100.0 –
Loose labour market 74.6 0.76 Loose labour market 112.8 0.81
Season Season
January* 100.0 – January* 100.0 –
February 83.0 0.97 February 102.2 1.36
March 77.2 0.91 March 98.9 1.34
April 96.7 1.11 April 102.6 1.32
May 77.2 0.94 May 105.0 1.44
June 72.4 0.89 June 108.3 1.43
July 89.7 1.04 July 106.6 1.34
August 77.7 0.93 August 100.9 1.36
September 96.1 1.11 September 100.6 1.37
October 89.1 1.08 October 109.5 1.45
November 59.0 0.76 November 110.4 1.49
December 54.5 0.7 December 111.7 1.44











South East* 100.0 –
East Anglia 117.4 1.95
South West 109.6 1.26
West Midlands 95.6 1.04
East Midlands 102.2 1.29
Yorkshire and Humberside 102.4 1.06
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Table 3 continued
Time of leaving unemployment Estimate SE Time of entering unemployment Estimate SE
The distribution of unobserved individual heterogeneity
Estimate SE Probability estimate SE
Support point ν1 53.1 2.54 0.36 0.030
Support point ν2* 100.0 – 0.40 0.041
Support point ν3 156.5 5.29 0.23 0.057
Support point ν4 277.0 19.64 0.01 0.004
Each cell contains the effect on the baseline hazard of leaving unemployment relative to the baseline hazard
of leaving unemployment (set equal to 100%). The asterisks show the characteristics of the baseline hazard
SE standard error
a A loose labour market refers to the 10th percentile, the baseline situation to the 50th percentile and a tight
labour market to the 90th percentile of the empirical distribution of labour market tightness
small.10 Singles have a 17% lower hazard of leaving unemployment compared to
married men. The distribution of unobserved heterogeneity is reported at the bottom
of Table 3. Individuals with an unobserved characteristic corresponding to the third
support point have a three times higher hazard of leaving unemployment compared
to individuals with an unobserved characteristic corresponding to the first support
point (156.5 vs. 53.1%). In contrast to the relatively small effects of observed indi-
vidual heterogeneity, unobserved individual heterogeneity plays an important role in
explaining the hazard of leaving unemployment. Figure 4 shows that sorting, that is
caused by significant individual heterogeneity, plays an important role in explaining
the observed (aggregate) negative duration dependence. The decrease in the hazard
of leaving unemployment between the 1st and 24th month in unemployment is about
41% with and 66% without controlling for individual heterogeneity. The different of
25%-points implies that sorting accounts for just over one-third of the strong decrease
in the hazard of leaving unemployment with duration. Negative individual duration
dependence explains the remaining two-thirds of this strong decrease.
4.2 Individual duration dependence over the business cycle
Figure 5a shows the hazard of leaving unemployment, as a function of the duration
in unemployment, for three states of the business cycle. At all durations the haz-
ard of leaving unemployment is significantly higher in a tight than in a loose labour
market. To examine how individual duration dependence changes over the business
cycle I normalise the hazard in the first month in unemployment to one (Fig. 5b).
Standard errors for all durations up to 30 months on the differences in the norma-
lised hazards in a tight relatively to a loose labour market are shown in Fig. 5c.
As discussed in the introduction, the matching model of Lockwood (1991) predicts
that the long term unemployed benefit relatively less from a tightening of the labour
10 See Kalwij (2004) for a more detailed analysis of regional differences in not only the hazard of leaving
unemployment but also, and more importantly, in the hazard of (re-) entering unemployment.
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market (suggests a negative slope in Fig. 5c), and the ranking model of Blanchard and
Diamond (1994) predicts that the long term unemployed benefit relatively more from
a tightening of the labour market (suggests a positive slope in Fig. 5c). A formal test
rejects the null-hypothesis that individual duration dependence does not vary over the
business cycle.11 This rejection is primarily due to significant effects for the durations
14–16 months. These effects are relatively small compared to the overall effect of the
business cycle; at most a 16.7% increase with a standard error of 4.6%. The conclusion
that emerges from Fig. 5a–c is that individual duration dependence does not change
in a systematic way over the business cycle. Hence, no strong empirical evidence is
found in favour of the matching model of Lockwood (1991) or the ranking model of
Blanchard and Diamond (1994). It may of course be the case that the opposite effects
concerning the cyclical sensitivity of duration dependence in the studies of Blanchard
and Diamond (1994) and Lockwood (1991) neutralize each other.
4.3 Sensitivity analysis
The conclusion that individual duration dependence does not vary in a systematic way
over the business cycle is in contrast with the conclusions of several of the previ-
ous empirical studies mentioned in the introduction. I am therefore interested in the
conclusion one would draw when using the restrictive models of empirical studies
that reach a different conclusion. For this reason I estimate the model without con-
trolling for individual heterogeneity (both observed and unobserved heterogeneity)
and inflow heterogeneity (i.e. the variation over the business cycle in the composi-
tion of the newly unemployed). These results are shown in Fig. 6a–c and for these
restricted models I only report on the differences in the normalised hazards for all
durations between the situations of a tight and a loose labour market. A cautionary
note on the interpretation of the results discussed below is that many previous empir-
ical studies did not only use a different empirical model but also analysed different
countries.12 Figure 6a is based on a model that does not control for individual heteroge-
neity and inflow heterogeneity. Figure 6a shows that aggregate duration dependence is
stronger the tighter the labour market at short durations and weaker the tighter the
labour market at long durations. This is in line with the conclusion of Abbring et al.
(2001) who do not fully control for inflow heterogeneity and use aggregate US data.
Figure 6b is based on a model that controls for inflow heterogeneity but not for indi-
vidual heterogeneity. The most striking results in Fig. 6b is that once controlled for
inflow heterogeneity the apparent upward sloping difference in Fig. 6a has virtually
disappeared. This finding that individual duration dependence does not significantly
vary over the business cycle at higher durations once controlled for inflow heteroge-
neity is in line with the evidence for British men in Turon (2003). She uses aggregate
data and does not identify significant presence of unobserved individual heterogeneity.
The significant cyclical variation present in Fig. 6b at short durations is reported in
11 H0 : β2,2 = · · · = β2,32 = 0 The Wald-test statistic is equal to 81.5 and the critical value is 45 with a
5% level of significance.
12 For instance, the different results obtained for other countries may be due to differences in labour market
institutions.
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Fig. 6 Sensitivity analysis. Differences over the business cycle in the normalised hazards by duration
using three restricted models: a without controlling for individual heterogeneity and inflow heterogeneity,
b without controlling for individual heterogeneity and controlling for inflow heterogeneity, and c controlling
for individual heterogeneity and not controlling for inflow heterogeneity
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several studies, for instance in Rosholm (2001), and may be due to insufficient control
for unobserved individual heterogeneity. Figure 6c is based on a model that controls
for individual heterogeneity but not for inflow heterogeneity. Figure 6c clearly shows
that individual duration dependence is weaker the tighter the labour market and that
these differences are significant for most durations from the eighth month onwards.
The pattern in Fig. 6c is in line with the prediction of the ranking model of Blanchard
and Diamond (1994). For instance, Dynarski and Sheffrin (1990), using US individ-
ual level panel data, control for heterogeneity but not for inflow heterogeneity and
this may explain their conclusion, in line with Fig. 6c, that the business cycle has the
strongest effect on the longest elapsed durations in unemployment.
The results of this sensitivity analysis show that duration dependence on an aggre-
gate level is stronger the tighter the labour market at short durations and weaker the
tighter the labour market at long durations (Fig. 6a) but that most of this variation is
explained by individual heterogeneity. Ignoring individual heterogeneity biases the
pattern of duration dependence somewhat in favour of cyclical sensitivity at shorter
durations (Fig. 6b vs. Fig. 5c). Moreover, when ignoring that the composition of the
newly unemployed varies over the business cycle (i.e. inflow heterogeneity) one can
mistakenly conclude that there is significant empirical evidence of negative individ-
ual duration dependence being weaker the tighter the labour market, as predicted by
the ranking model of Blanchard and Diamond (1994) (Fig. 6c vs. Fig. 5c). A possible
explanation for this latter finding is given by counter-cyclical inflow heterogeneity and
a pro-cyclical individual hazard of leaving unemployment. The looser the labour mar-
ket the higher skilled the average newly unemployed and all unemployed individuals
remain unemployed longer. When the labour market tightens the pool of unemployed at
each duration is relatively higher skilled compared to a situation when the labour mar-
ket loosens, hence relatively higher (normalised) hazards of leaving unemployment.
These dynamics are in line with the pattern in Fig. 6c. This explanation is empiri-
cally supported by the fact I find counter-cyclical inflow heterogeneity and that once
controlled for inflow heterogeneity the upward slope in Fig. 6c virtually disappears
(Fig. 5c).
5 Summary
In this paper I examined the effects on the hazard of leaving unemployment of the
duration in unemployment, individual heterogeneity and the business cycle. And in
particular I examined in detail the variation over the business cycle in individual dura-
tion dependence of the hazard of leaving unemployment. For this purpose I have used a
large panel of administrative unemployment records of British males from April 1987
to September 1996 and the ratio regional vacancies over unemployment, referred to
as labour market tightness, to control for business cycle effects. The main empirical
findings are the following:
(1) The strong decrease in the aggregate hazard of leaving unemployment with
elapsed duration is about 65% within the first 2 years. Sorting, due to individual
heterogeneity, accounts for one-third and negative individual duration depen-
dence for two-thirds of this decrease.
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(2) Significant and strong business cycle effects are identified. An individual’s hazard
of leaving unemployment is about 80% higher in a tight relative to a loose labour
market. Concerning the variation over the business cycle in the composition of
the newly unemployed with respect to their employability (inflow heterogene-
ity) I find that men who become unemployed when the labour market is tight
have on average a 21% lower hazard of leaving unemployment than men who
become unemployed when the labour market is loose. The pro-cyclical effect of
the business cycle on the individual hazard of leaving unemployment dominates
the counter-cyclical effect of the business cycle on the hazard through inflow
heterogeneity. This leaves the business cycle effect on individuals’ hazard of
leaving unemployment as the main determinant of the longer average unemploy-
ment durations in a loose labour market. The results imply, by combining these
effects, that the average hazard of leaving unemployment is about 35% higher in
a tight than in a loose labour market.
(3) Most of the systematic variation over the business cycle in duration dependence
of the hazard of leaving unemployment on an aggregate level is explained by indi-
vidual heterogeneity, and in particular inflow heterogeneity. Individual duration
dependence does not vary over the business cycle in a way that would lend support
to the predictions concerning this of the matching model of Lockwood (1991)
or the ranking model of Blanchard and Diamond (1994). Moreover I show that
failing to control for inflow heterogeneity, as is often done in empirical research,
biases the variation in duration dependence over the business cycle in favour of
the prediction concerning this variation of the ranking model of Blanchard and
Diamond (1994).
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Appendix
See Tables 4 and 5.
Table 4 Estimation results of the complete model outlined by Eqs. 5–9
Duration dependence Duration dependence Seasonal effects
× labour market tightness (months of the year)
Parameter Estimate SE Parameter Estimate SE Parameter Estimate SE
β1,1 −2.190 0.029 β2,1 0.489 0.017 β2,33 −0.186 0.012




Duration dependence Duration dependence Seasonal effects
× labour market tightness (months of the year)
Parameter Estimate SE Parameter Estimate SE Parameter Estimate SE
β1,3 0.334 0.010 β2,3 0.021 0.019 β2,35 −0.034 0.011
β1,4 0.268 0.010 β2,4 0.013 0.021 β2,36 −0.259 0.012
β1,5 0.130 0.012 β2,5 −0.035 0.023 β2,37 −0.323 0.012
β1,6 0.047 0.013 β2,6 −0.027 0.025 β2,38 −0.109 0.012
β1,7 0.029 0.014 β2,7 −0.031 0.027 β2,39 −0.252 0.012
β1,8 0.144 0.014 β2,8 0.033 0.028 β2,40 −0.040 0.012
β1,9 0.137 0.015 β2,9 0.045 0.030 β2,41 −0.115 0.012
β1,10 0.021 0.017 β2,10 0.013 0.033 β2,42 −0.528 0.013
β1,11 −0.078 0.019 β2,11 0.030 0.036 β2,43 −0.607 0.013
β1,12 −0.126 0.020 β2,12 0.039 0.039 Single person
β1,13 −0.093 0.021 β2,13 0.033 0.040 β3,1 −0.155 0.007
β1,14 −0.072 0.022 β2,14 0.120 0.043 Region
β1,15 −0.007 0.023 β2,15 0.095 0.044 β3,2 0.160 0.017
β1,16 0.148 0.023 β2,16 0.152 0.046 β3,3 0.092 0.012
β1,17 0.083 0.025 β2,17 0.054 0.049 β3,4 −0.045 0.011
β1,18 −0.123 0.029 β2,18 0.081 0.056 β3,5 0.021 0.013
β1,19 −0.208 0.031 β2,19 0.023 0.060 β3,6 0.024 0.010
β1,20 −0.123 0.032 β2,20 0.112 0.062 β3,7 −0.031 0.010
β1,21 −0.210 0.035 β2,21 0.017 0.070 β3,8 −0.019 0.012
β1,22 −0.281 0.037 β2,22 0.097 0.073 β3,9 0.005 0.013
β1,23 −0.355 0.040 β2,23 −0.063 0.078 β3,10 0.006 0.010
β1,24 −0.527 0.045 β2,24 −0.071 0.086 Age category
β1,25 −0.401 0.043 β2,25 0.144 0.089 β3,11 −0.040 0.009
β1,26 −0.179 0.042 β2,26 −0.146 0.087 β3,12 −0.183 0.010
β1,27 −0.077 0.041 β2,27 −0.008 0.081 β3,13 −0.234 0.012
β1,28 −0.229 0.047 β2,28 −0.131 0.097 β3,14 −0.296 0.013
β1,29 −0.356 0.052 β2,29 0.031 0.106 β3,15 −0.294 0.013
β1,30 −0.388 0.054 β2,30 0.117 0.119 β3,16 −0.310 0.014
β1,31 1.118 0.211 β2,31 0.477 0.518 β3,17 −0.387 0.014
β1,32 −0.469 0.056 β2,32 −0.176 0.139 β3,18 −0.346 0.017
Inflow heterogeneity Unobserved heterogeneity
Labour market tightness Support points
β4,1 −0.201 0.012 ν1 0 –
Month of inflow ν2 0.634 0.048
β4,2 0.022 0.013 ν3 1.082 0.045
β4,3 −0.012 0.014 ν4 1.652 0.056
β4,4 0.025 0.013 Probabilities
β4,5 0.048 0.014 π1 0.363 0.030
β4,6 0.080 0.013 π2 0.396 0.041
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Table 4 continued
Duration dependence Duration dependence Seasonal effects
× labour market tightness (months of the year)
Parameter Estimate SE Parameter Estimate SE Parameter Estimate SE
β4,7 0.064 0.013 π3 0.231 0.057





These equations define the parameters in the table. The mean log-likelihood function is equal to −2.78561
(222,901 observations)
Table 5 Empirical results when using only individuals who experienced at least two completed unemploy-
ment spells
Time of leaving unemployment Estimate SE Time of entering unemployment Estimate SE
Business cyclea Business cyclea
Tight labour market 136.9 1.54 Tight labour market 88.0 0.70
Baseline 100.0 − Baseline 100.0 –
Loose labour market 73.1 0.82 Loose labour market 113.6 0.90
Season Season
January 100.0 − January 100.0 –
February 83.7 1.07 February 100.4 1.45
March 77.4 1.00 March 98.8 1.46
April 97.2 1.22 April 102.2 1.43
May 78.2 1.04 May 104.7 1.57
June 73.1 0.99 June 107.9 1.55
July 90.9 1.15 July 105.8 1.44
August 78.6 1.03 August 100.7 1.47
September 97.8 1.23 September 100.1 1.49
October 89.2 1.18 October 109.8 1.58
November 58.9 0.83 November 110.0 1.61
















South East 100.0 −
East Anglia 115.3 2.14
South West 106.6 1.35
West Midlands 94.8 1.17
East Midlands 99.3 1.40
Yorkshire and Humberside 100.3 1.14





Not Single (incl. divorce) 112.7 2.64
Single 100.0 −
The distribution of unobserved individual heterogeneity
Estimate SE Probability estimate SE
Support point 1 51.0 2.49 0.44 0.022
Support point 2 100.0 − 0.40 0.055
Support point 3 151.4 9.23 0.15 0.062
Support point 4 235.6 19.52 0.01 0.010
These results are compared with the results in Table 3 that are discussed in Sect. 4. As in Table 3, each
cell contains the effect on the baseline hazard of leaving unemployment relative to the baseline hazard of
leaving unemployment (set equal to 100%). The asterisks show the characteristics of the baseline hazard
SE standard error
a A loose labour market refers to the 10th percentile, the baseline situation to the 50th percentile and a tight
labour market to the 90th percentile of the empirical distribution of labour market tightness
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